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This paper reviews the arguments that justify the principles of pro-
portional and degressively proportional representation.
1 Introduction
In current practice, apportionnements are obtained through negociation, with
references to principles of justice, fairness, or e¢ ciency. This essay is devoted to
the second aspect: What has been, and what should be, the content of the no-
tions of justice, fairnessand e¢ cientcywith respect to apportionnement
problems? Usual justications in this literature rest on intuitive appeal for
equality, but the structure of the apportionnment problem is complex enough
that it is not clear what exactly we should aim at equalizing, or that equality
should be the ultimate goal. In this regard I rst review the early literature,
which considers as obvious the idea that strictly proportional representation is
ideal (section 2). In the more recent literature I distinguish three major argu-
ments.
The Poor Representativity argument in favor of degressive proportionality
(section 3) echoes the ancient view that a single delegate cannot represent well
a very large number of citizens. This view has been given a clean mathematical
expression known as the Square Root Law. The welfarist approach (section 4)
has, more recently, clearly enunciated the argument in favor of proportionality,
a point which I call here the Pure Majoritarian argument in favor of propor-
tionality. The welfarist framework also provides a simple argument in favor of
degressive proportionality, which I call the Utilitarian-Egalitarian argument.
This last point appears to be the mathematical expression of the commonly




Equality is a very basic form of justice requirement, which appears in almost
all denitions of justice or just institutions. Many philosophical as well as
practical controversies can be seen as debates about what should be equalized,
but once the equalizandum is found, the determination of justice is a matter of
weight, an operation essentially quantitative. Consider, for instance Aristotles
classication of the social philosophies of his time:
... all men agree that what is just in distribution must be accord-
ing to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same
sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman,
supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and sup-
porters of aristocracy with excellence.
The just, then, is a species of the proportionate.
[Nichomachean Ethics Book V, chapter 3]
The practical question of allocating seats of an assembly to represent voters
presents itself already in mathematical, quantitative, terms: How manyseats
per country, per district, per party, per voter, etc. In such a case, Aristotles
phrase The just is a species of the proportionate can easily be taken word
for word. Then the general requirement of equality may seem, at rst sight,
to have a non-questionable consequence: the ultimate democratic unit is the
citizen, therefore one should seek to equalize the number of seats per citizen.
Many would consider this denition of a justapportionment as obvious, and
would not ellaborate further on the notion of equality.
For instance, concerning the European Parliament, Balinski and Young (1982a)
wrote:
Trans-national parties have formed. Members of Parliament no
longer vote in national blocs; instead of representing purely national
interests they represent people in one larger European Community.
This new situation means, however, that representatives ought prop-
erly to represent equal numbers of constituents no matter in what
nation they happen to reside.
Starting from the a priori idea that the representational ideal was propor-
tionality, the early mathematical literature on the subject has thus neglected to
provide further justication of why proportionality is desirable. Instead of this
normative enquiry, it has focused on a peripheral, albeit very practical question:
the question of the rounding methods. If each representative is to represent the
same number of citizens, strictly proportional representation usually would rec-
ommend fractional numbers of representatives. In practice, one has thus to move
away from strict proportionality in order to have a denite, integer, number of
representatives. Practical apportionnement can only be proportional up to one
seat, and the di¤erent rounding methods can be compaired to that respect
(Balinski and Young 1982b).
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The Cambridge Compromise (Grimmet et al, 2011) has tackled carefully the
questions of roundings to integers, but has also put forward the idea that the
principle of degressive proportionality should be conceived independently of the
rounding questions.
3 Degressive proportionality
The voting power literature started with the observation that with a weighted
voting rule, the possibility for the vote of a country to make a di¤erence is not
in direct relation with its weight. A well-known example is the voting rule used
at the Council of the European Union in 1958-1973 after the Treaty of Rome,
which is the rst version of the European Union.
The European Economic Community had six member states. France, Ger-
many and Italy had 4 votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands had 2 votes and
Luxembourg had 1 vote. Acts proposed by the Commission required 12 votes
to be adopted.
In this case, the single Luxembourg vote can never make a di¤erence for
reaching or not the threshold of 12 votes. Formally, Luxembourg has no power
at all.
An even simpler example is a two-voter society using weighted majority rule
with unequal weights for the two voters. Then the smaller voter has no power
at all. Such examples make it clear that it would be a mistake to trust that
proportional representation automatically ensures proportional power.
From this observation, and with the objective of designing a fair appor-
tionment system and of representing people equally, one might therefore seek
to equalize across citizens the voting power, dened as the probability that a
citizen, through the election, makes a di¤erence.
It is important at this point to note that the voting power approach relies
on hypotheses that must be made precise to describe how individual opinions
are formed and translated into votes of their representatives. Also, one should
not confuse the question of how many delegates should one country send to an
assembly and the question of how many votes should be given to each country in
a council deliberation. In the former case, the delegates of the country may well
belong to di¤erent parties and split their votes, in the latter case, the country
will have one voice. In both cases, proportionality can be a theoretical answer,
but the two cases are clearly not to be confused.
The most usual hypothesis is independent voting. This means that the
individual opinions are independent random variables with the same law (usually
a probability :5 to favor or to object the proposal) and that, most importantly,
any two individuals have the same probability to be in agreement, whether they
are citizens of the same country or not.
In the case of Bloc voting, that is when each country is represented by
a single spokesman (its government) or if all the representatives vote the same
way, a much-celebrated result, known as the square-root law is obtained.
Under this set of hypotheses, the power of an individual citizen to change her
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countrys vote will be equalized across individuals if the weight of each country
is proportional to
p
n, where n is the number of citizens in the country (Penrose,
1946; Lindner and Machover 2004, S÷omczyn´ski and ·Zyczkowski, 2004, 2010).
The logic behind this result is well explained by Penrose himself:
...small electorates are less susceptible to control by resolute blocs
and are likely to obtain more representative governments than large
electorates. If factors other than numerical size are constant, the
spokesman for any electorate represents a section of that electorate
proportional to the square root of the total number of electors.
The political argument is that the quality of national representations de-
creases with the size of their populations. We could call this point the Poor
Representativity argument in favor of degressive proportionality. Un-
der specic assumptions (independence), this decrease of quality can be ex-
pressed mathematically, leading to the concluclusion that the probability for a
citizen of a country of size n to be pivotal is proportional to 1=
p
n. Giving weightp
n to the country compensates exactly and is thus fairbecause it equalizes
the probability of being decisive among citizens of the di¤erent countries.
Up to my knowledge this precise argument was rst raised by Penrose and
was not discussed in political science. A somehow related idea is that overly large
bodies of constituents cannot form a nation. To quote again Aristotle: You
cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city
no longer.[Nichomachean Ethics Book IX, chapter 10]. But Penroses idea is to
explain the loss of representativity by the statistical utuations of independent
variables, and this particular point can hardly be found, even informally stated,
in the political science literature.
Felsenthal and Machover (1998) propose another equalisandum besides vot-
ing power: the expected value of the majority decit, where the majority decit
after a decision is 0 for all countries where a majority of voters support the de-
cision, and is equal for the other countries to the di¤erence between the number
of individuals who object to the decision and the number of of individuals who
aggree with the decision. A square-root law can then be derived, again under
the assumption of independent voting.
In testing the theoretical ideas that justify the square root law, Gelman,
Katz and Bafumi (2004) noticed that the empirical estimate one can produce of
the probability of being pivotal is closer to 1=n than to 1=
p
n. They deduce that
the proportional representation is basically faircompared to a representation
that would follow the square-root law.
Di¤erent formulas and indices have previously been proposed to quantify
various kinds of voting power: see Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzaf (1965),
Owen (1972), or Laruelle and Valenciano (2005). These formulas are more or
less explicitely related to models of how countriesvotes derive from the opinions
of the citizens and to how coalitions of countries emerge. They can be used to
describe actual parliaments (see Barr and Passarelli (2009) for the EU). Surveys
of the theory of voting power have been published by Felsenthal and Machover
(1998) and more recently by Laruelle and Valenciano (2008).
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The square-root law is an instance of degressive proportionality (up to round-
ing). Degressively proportional allocations are often found in practice and advo-
cated (Lamassoure and Severin, 2007). This may explain why the square-root
law has gained some popularity among those who discuss which mathematical
formula could be adopted as a rule to dene the weights of representatives in
commissions and/or the composition of parliaments.1 But the argument itself
upon which the square-root rule is based, the Poor Representativity argument,
has not gained much endorsement. In a sense the intellectual construction of
the square-root rule is appreciated because of its consequences more than as a
justication of these consequences.
The Cambridge Compromise took as a constraint that the apportionnement
should be degressively proportional. It recommends a Base+Prop formula: a
number of seats is divided equally among the countries independently of their
population gures and a number of seats is allocated in proportion of the popu-
lation. The consequence of using a Base+Prop formula is a degressively propor-
tional distribution of seats (up to roundings). The proposal is not grounded on
a single principle to be applied or on a criterion to be optimized, but the idea
can nevertheless be faithfully explained as resulting from two (contradictory!)
principles. A principle of equality among states is served by the Base, that is
the xed number of seats allocated to each of them, and a principle of equality
among citizens is served by the proportional part of the allocation.
4 Welfarism
The ideal of equalizing voting power may be criticized, as any form of egalitar-
ianism. For instance, a trivial way to equalize voting power would be to make
decisions randomly, with no regard to individualsopinions. This obviously bad
solution is egalitarian, which proves that equality cannot be the only criterion.
A voting rule has consequences for each citizen. If we are able to measure how
good the rule is for each citizen, be it by some voting power measure or
any other index, we obtain, associated to each rule, a distribution of the index
accross the whole population. It is this distribution which has to be evaluated.
As is common in social sciences, in evaluating such distributions, one is
faced with a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equality, two requirements which
are partially, but not completely, opposed. The apportionment problem is no
exception and, as an institutional design problem, requires for its solution that
the social objectives be clearly stated.
For a single yes/no decision, Barbera and Jackson (2006) show that the
rule that would maximize the sum, across individuals, of expected utility is a
weighted voting rule, where the weight of a country is proportional to the social
importance of the issue at stake for this countrys citizens. Barbera and Jakson
use a hypothesis of independence across countries and Beisbart and Bovens
(2007) and Beisbart and Hartmann (2010) relax this hypothesis to show how
1See the open letter How to vote in the Council of the European Union", signed by several
scientists in 2008. http://chaos.if.uj.edu.pl/~karol/pdf/voting08.pdf
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the results then depend on how di¤erent countriesinterests are correlated. (See
also Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008.)
This approach ellaborates on a very natural argument in favor of propor-
tionality which can be stated, in its simplest form, as follows:
Suppose that the citizens of a country always share the same opinion; that is
the countrys vote. Suppose moreover that the stake is the same for all citizens
in all countries, say +1 or 0. We can think that a citizen will earn 1 Euro if the
collective decision matches her will and 0 if not. Then the e¢ cient collective
decision is clear: it should follow the will of the majority, for that is the way
for the whole society to benet more. In that case, the majoritarian outcome
is easily obtained by applying to each countrys vote a weight proportional to
its population. This provides justication for proportionality by the e¢ ciency
of majority rule in these one-shot yes/no decisions, which have the same impor-
tance for everyone. We can call this point the Pure Majoritarian argument
in favor of proportionality.
It turns out that this simple point is quite robust to a number of variations.
Suppose for instance that, within each country, not all citizens but a xed
fraction (larger than :5) of them agree with the countrys vote. Then simple
computation shows that the result is the same. Suppose now that the opinions
are randomly generated. Since proportionality is optimal in every instance, it is
also optimal ex ante, for instance in expectation.
The obvious drawback of the Pure Majoritarian argument is that, when we
do not take one but several decisions, members of small countries are less often
satised than members of large countries. The argument can then be turned
into arguments in favor of decreasing proportionality in two ways. Still consider,
for simplicity, the extreme case where all the citizens of a country share the same
opinion.
First, consider that the objective is not e¢ ciency but equality, among citizens
of di¤erent countries, of the probability pi that the nal decision matches citi-
zen is preference. Give the same weight to all countries, large or small. Then
if opinions are independent from one country to the other, pi is same within
each country and also the same from one country to the other. Equalty is thus
achieved. One can obtain in this way a justication for the idea that countries
should be represented per se, independently of their size. Because degressive
proportionality is in between constant and proportional weights, it is justi-
ed by a compromise between e¢ ciency and equality (Beisbart and Hartmann,
2010).
Second, if one has in mind that a constitutional decision such as the weights
given to the countries will govern not only one but a long sequence of future
decisions, one should consider that the utility for a citizen of the voting scheme is
not simply+1 or 0 but stems from the fact that her will is going to be more or less
often fullled. This frequency, say pi is the object of preference of the individual
i, and the social judgment should bear on the distribution of these frequencies
pi in the population. It turns out that if the utility attached to frequency pi
by the individual i is a concave function, say  (pi), common to all individuals,
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then maximizing the sum of individual utilities ususally leads to recommend
weighted voting rules whose weights are degressively proportional with respect
to the countriespopulations (Koriyama and Laslier 2011; Macé and Treibich
2011). The concavity of the individual evaluation of pi can be interpreted, as
usual, in terms of decreasing marginal utility. The marginal satisfaction obtained
by an individual when her pi is raised from, say, :60 to :61 is larger than the
one obtained when her pi is raised from, say, :71 to :72.
The two previous arguments, equality and concave utilitarianism, are in fact
equivalent, a pattern familiar in normative economics, which links utilitarianism
to the theory of inequality (see for instance Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson,
2002). Indeed, when the social criterion is the sum of individual utilities, the
concavity of utility with respect to pi also means that the society would gain by
having one pi decresased from :71 to :70 and another pj increased from :60 to :61.
The two versions of this idea can thus be given a single name: the Utilitarian-
Egalitarian argument in favor of decreasing proportionality.
This argument is intuitive in the case of a committee, where each country
has one and only one delegate who is to be given some weight, and in the
case of a parliament dealing with issues about which all the citizens share the
opinion voiced by their representatives. It can be proven that the argument is
still valid as soon as the citizensopinions are not completely independent from
their country of residence (Koriyama and Laslier 2011).
The idea that small countries should be given relatively more weight because,
otherwise, they would systematically lose is familiar in politics. The Utilitarian-
Egalitarian approach articulates this sensible concern. When a populous country
has a weight proportional to its population, its citizens are better treated than
the citizens of smaller countries because that country is relatively more often in
a position to dictate its choice. It may therefore be fair to redistribute part of
this large weight to smaller countries.
The Cambridge Compromise solution was not designed to be optimal with
respect to some utilitarian-egalitarian criterion. It nevertheless shares an im-
portant qualitative property with these allocation schemes, namely degressive
proportionality.
References
[1] Aristotle (350 BC) Nichomachean Ethics, Translated by W. D. Ross. The
Internet Classic Archive http://classics.mit.edu
[2] Michel Balinski and H. Peyton Young (1982a) Fair representation in the
European ParliamentJournal of Common Market Studies 20 (4): 361
373.
[3] Michel Balinski and H. Peyton Young (1982b) Fair Representation: Meet-
ing the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press.
7
[4] John F. Banzhaf (1965) Weighted voting doesnt work: A mathematical
analysisRutgers Law Review 19: 317 343.
[5] Salvador Barberà and Matthew O. Jackson (2006) On the weights of na-
tions: assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous unionJournal of Polit-
ical Economy 114: 317 339.
[6] Jason Barr and Francesco Passarelli (2009) Who has the power in EU?
Mathematical Social Sciences 57: 339 366.
[7] Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens (2007) Welfarist evaluations of decision
rules for boards of representativesSocial Choice and Welfare 29:581 608.
[8] Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann (2010) Welfarist evaluations of de-
cision rules under interstate utility dependenciesSocial Choice and Wel-
fare 34: 315 344.
[9] Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (2002) Utilitar-
ianism and the theory of justicein: K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzu-
mura (editors) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, voume 1, Amster-
dam: Elsevier, pp. 543 596.
[10] Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover (1998) The Measurement of Power:
Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar.
[11] Andrew Gelman, Jonathan N. Katz and Joseph Bamu (2004) Standard
Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical AnalysisBritish Jour-
nal of Political Science 34: 657 674.
[12] Geo¤rey Grimmett, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Jean-François Laslier, Victo-
riano Ramírez González, Richard Rose, Wojciech S÷omczyn´ski, Martin
Zachariasen, and Karol ·Zyczkowski (2011) The allocation between the EU
Member States of the seats in the European Parliament: The Cambridge
Compromise. European Parliament, Policy department, Constitutional af-
fairs.
[13] Yukio Koriyama and Jean-François Laslier (2011) Optimal apportion-
nementworking paper, Ecole Polytechnique.
[14] Alain Lamassoure and Adrian Severin (2007) Report on the com-
position of the European Parliament European Parliament, avail-
able at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-0351+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
[15] Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (2005) Assessing success and
decisiveness in voting situationsSocial Choice andWelfare 24: 171 197.
[16] Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (2008) Voting and Collective
Decision-Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8
[17] Ines Lindner and Moshé Machover (2004). L.S. Penroses limit theorem:
Proof of some special casesMathematical Social Sciences 47: 37 49.
[18] Antonin Macé and Rafael Treibich. (2011). Computing the optimal
weights in a utilitarian model of apportionnmentMathematical Social Sci-
ences forthcoming.
[19] Guillermo Owen (1972) Political games. Naval Research Logistics Quar-
terly 18: 345 354.
[20] Lionel S. Penrose (1946) The elementary statistics of majority voting
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53 57.
[21] Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution
of power in a committee systemAmerican Political Science Review 48:
787 792.
[22] Wojciech S÷omczyn´ski and Karol ·Zyczkowski (2004) Voting in the Eu-
ropean Union: The square root system of Penrose and a critical point
ciond-mat 0405396v2. arXiv.org. Warsaw.
[23] Wojciech S÷omczyn´ski and Karol ·Zyczkowski (2010) Jagiellonian Compro-
mise: an alternative voting system for the Council of the European Union
in: M. Cichocki and K. Zyczkowski (editors) Institutional Design and Vot-
ing Power in the European Union Ashgate Publishing Group, pp. 43 57.
9
